Abbatoir: a
slaughterhouse; from French abbatre,
meaning to strike down
Terroristi
The term “terrorist”
was applied to those who were still loyal to the communist government during
the revolution. Often applied to members of the Securitate who sprayed a protesting
crowed with bullets, killing 100 people. It was rumoured that
1,000/10,000/60,000 were killed the night of December 16/17, 1989. It is
suggested that this was a last ditch attempt to scare away protestors to
maintain Ceausescu’s rule. But Ceausescu fled after this failed.
The Romanian Anticommunist
Revolution and the Terrorists
|
This
mysterious figure, which was rather a figment of irrational thought, gave
free reign to the imagination. According to one conspiracy theory, the secret
about the terrorists is well kept by only a handful of important people with
a hidden agenda. Romanians are divided over the existence of terrorists: some
believe they existed, others that it was all a set-up to benefit the new
power.
But was the profile of the Romanian revolution terrorist? He was generally believed to be an educated, black-haired man of athletic build and average height. He allegedly owned sophisticated weapons, disguising and diversion equipment and all kinds of electronic devices like transmission and reception equipment, weapons simulators and infrared devices. According to some people in the military, about 100 people believed to be terrorists were captured and handed over to the superiors but later released. Those people were suspected of being members of two divisions created to fight behind the frontline in the event of an invasion within the army and the Securitate secret police known as “R” and “S”, respectively. The only viable explanation is that the members of these two groups were ordered to act, as a last-resort solution. In 1989, Andrei Banc was a TV journalist. He lived close to the University Square, a place that saw some of the heated moments of the revolution. In 1999, he told the Oral History Centre of the Romanian Radio Broadcasting Revolution of something that struck him during the shooting:: Andrei Banc: “I could hear intermittent sound of machine gun fire and I saw people lying on the ground for cover at the corner of the National Theatre, but the odd thing was that there was no sound of bullets flying past. I should have been able to hear the bullets going through the air or hitting the walls. I went to where all the people were lying and stayed there for a while, and I thought it had to have been a simulator, it couldn’t have been a machine gun, because you couldn’t hear the sound of bullets. I looked up but couldn’t see any weapon firing from a window. People had already started to talk about simulators. I made my way home carrying several loaves of bread. My flat was 50 meters away. My wife was waving at me desperately, but I was walking on unruffled. People were shouting at me to lie down, it was absolutely hallucinating, that machine gun seemed to never cease firing, it went on firing even after I reached my flat and went out on the balcony.” A participant in the events at Palace Square career officer Valentin Gabrielescu also recalled the strange things that happened back then. Valentin Gabrielescu: “I witnessed the terrorist attack on the Central Committee. There was no terrorist, no shots were fired at the Central Committee. I stood by the window all night long, the windows were large and the light was on. And nobody shot at me! The walls were not hit. As a career military man, I can tell where shots are fired from. These paratroopers and soldiers were all firing at the terrorists that had allegedly taken over the Royal Palace, but there were no terrorists there. Some people climbed on top of the museum, to raise a flag. I then recognised Ion Caramitru, I knew he was an actor. He was shouting: ‘Stop firing. Stop firing! There is no terrorist here’. I approached the soldiers and paratroopers who were firing their guns like crazy. I told one of them: son, who are you firing at, for God’s sake? It was already dark. He answered: I’m firing at the terrorists. Did you see any terrorist, I asked? You are a paratrooper, a well-trained soldier. Bullets are for human targets. Who are you firing at right now? The Royal Palace? I went to talk to the officer and told him: captain, stop firing. He said he could not control them”. No conclusion could be drawn as to the existence of terrorists. But what is unarguable is that the revolution victims cannot be blamed only on the void of power caused by the toppling of Ceausescu, on the generalised state of confusion or on misfortune. In the end, the truth regarding the involvement of terrorists in the Romanian revolution might turn out to be rather ordinary and therefore hard to accept. |
The Securitate
Securitate
still around under Romanian Intelligence Service?
It is
still not known precisely how many Romanians were employed by the Securitate,
partly as a consequence of the lack of material released since the collapse of
Communism. Deletant estimates that from a population of 23 million people in
1989, available records indicate total DSS personnel of 38, 682.Virgil
Magureanu, director of the SRI (Serviciul Roman de Informatii), which
wasformed on 26 March 1990 as the successor to the Securitate, estimates that
in 1989 total Securitate personnel totalled only 14, 259, although this figure
does not include those engaged in activities outside Romania, and Lavinia Stan
suggests the continuity of influence between the Securitate and the SRI means
that these figures cannot be trusted. The variance in figures between Magureanu
and Deletant illustrates a long running debate over just how many individuals
were employed by the Securitate. What is further unknown were how many people
were hired to act as informers to the secret police, although this figure is
considered to be extensive: Deletant simply categorises ‘tens of thousands of
informers’ whom the Securitate, ‘by exploiting fear, was able to
recruit’. It has been estimated that
by the 1980s as many as one in every 30 Romanians was working as a Securitate
informant.
The
Securitate’s own records claimed that 97 percent of all informers were
recruited voluntarily because of their ‘political and patriotic sentiment’, 1.5
percent were recruited through offers of financial compensation, and 1.5
percent through the use of blackmail with compromising evidence’.Frankly such
statistics are farcical. Lavinia Stan estimates that between 400,000-700,000
part time informers were ‘employed’ by the Securitate and the chances of 97
percent of these being loyal to the regime is highly unlikely considering the
low living standards and repressive policies in place under Ceausescu. Similar
to the East German Stasi, fear was an essential method of
recruitment employed by the Securitate, with threats and blackmail routinely
used to coerce informants. It is likely that people dared not refuse the
‘offer’ of informing out of fear that they too would end up on the Securitate
black list, marked as an ‘enemy’ or opponent of the state. The consequences
could be serious; for example, World War Two veteran George Marzanca refused to
collaborate with the Securitate and within a month he had been arrested and
sentenced to four years imprisonment, on spurious grounds. In reality then
there was often little real ‘choice’ in the matter; so perhaps it is little
wonder that many people ‘willingly’ accepted informant status (Lavinia Stan, Inside the
Securitate Archives).
The
targeting of ethnic Hungarians in a town called Dej met with initial opposition
from Laszlo Tokes, who was a pastor with the Hungarian Reformed Church. Tokes gained
widespread support within his parish and as a result he was soon targeted by
the Securitate. Tokes and his friends were placed under constant surveillance
and subject to daily harassment until pressure on the clergy eventually led to
Tokes removal and enforced ‘deportation’ to a village 40 kilometers from Dej,
in 1982 . The example of Tokes is telling in a number of respects:
demonstrating the use of extensive coercion by Securitate agents; illustrating
the lengths to which the regime would go to get rid of an opponent and
exemplifying the power of the state over the Reformed Church; as members of the
clergy could be forced to denounce their staff at the will of the party.
The case of Tokes further highlights the use
of intimidation, brutality and terror tactics by the Securitate. A second
attempt to deport Tokes was issued on 20 October 1989; this time he was ordered
to leave the town of Timisoara, where he had been reluctantly appointed after
the involvement of the US senate. After his refusal, on 2 November, four
attackers armed with knives broke into the flat, ‘while Securitate agents
looked on’. Fortunately Tokes survived thanks to his friends fighting the
attackers off, but this instance indicates the willingness of the Securitate to
tolerate state sanctioned murder. The second attempt to deport Tokes was met by
a united public outcry from both Romanians and Hungarians.
In
the trial… The prosecutor Gica Popo also
demanded to know who gave the order to shoot in the Timisoara uprising, and
surprisingly Elena and Nicolae blame the Securitate, accusing them of
being ‘terrorists’ who killed indiscriminately; they also deny being
in charge of the Securitate, although it was
common knowledge that the Ceausescus’ had authorised their acts of terror.
Following a hurried trial by military tribunal, both Nicolae and Elena
Ceausescu were sentenced to immediate execution via firing squad.
Transcript of
Ceaucescu’s Trial
December 22 –
Defence minister ordered army to stand down. He was killed by the Securitate,
it is believed. The army sided with revolutionaries.
Excerpts from a NY Times Article
“Dr. Dragoi was part of a 1994 panel that concluded that
there were 10 unexplained deaths in hospitals. Strangers in medical garb were
roaming the halls, and the one running elevator No. 5 in one hospital was
suspected of killing patients.
Today Dr.
Dragoi, 43, is one of the few Romanians who knows exactly who shot him. A
former major admitted in a 1995 interview that he stood in the director's
office of the government newspaper building and sniped at passers-by. ''I was
scared,'' was his explanation. Dr. Dragoi, passing by, was hit in the leg and
still limps.
The major
was cashiered in 1995 and charged with shooting four people, one fatally. He
retorted that he was sorry he had not aimed at their heads.”
“Someone, Mr. Brucan now believes, ordered the secret
sniper units that Ceausescu had formed into action. Mr. Dinescu said he later
saw hotel rooms with guns and food hidden in the walls, and light poles rigged
with machine-gun simulators.
Ceausescu
fled north, stopping at a lakeside villa so his wife could grab jewelry. His
pilot, who is now dead, either pretended mechanical problems or said
antiaircraft radar was tracking them. They landed near Tergoviste, had a
bodyguard hijack two cars and sought safety at a government nursery, but they
were arrested by the army.”
“On Dec. 25, a tape of the trial shows, an arrogant
Ceausescu pounded the table and his wife broke down. Then their hands were tied
for execution, but not their bodies.
The
indiscriminate shooting continued, so the next night the bullet-riddled bodies
were put on display. By the next morning, the shooting faded away.
''That,''
said Mr. Brucan, ''was the proof of the pudding,'' and virtually the only
certainty left by a revolution that continues to haunt Romania.”
Still on the hunt for:
-confirmation of 7:00 radio station take over
-poisoned food or water (mentioned by NY Times article - people screaming into cameras that food and water had been poisoned - yet I have not found any other material to support this yet)
-possible Securitate activities on December 25th
-any regulation of alcohol during revolution (probably not)
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